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Abstract 
This paper discusses the role of public demand, in the form of a government 
procurement policy, in generating innovative solutions for healthcare infrastructure. It 
considers the effects of the project delivery system (planning, finance, construction and 
operation) for new hospitals on design innovation. It focuses on hospitals built under the 
UK’s private finance initiative (PFI), which was partly introduced to inject increased 
innovation into hospital delivery. We use case studies of six early PFI hospitals to argue 
that the introduction of PFI has increased the complexity at the interface between 
project delivery and hospital operational functions. The result is a project delivery 
model which yields less innovative outcomes and produces facilities that might not be 
able to cope with future changes in demand. The paper suggests that new public 
procurement models do not automatically provide efficiency and innovation benefits. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Increased interest in the use of ‘public demand’ to secure innovative solutions and 
products, and improve the delivery of public services, was recently highlighted by Edler 
and Georghiou (2007). Drawing on earlier work by Dalpé et al. (1992) which shows 
how the state often acts as a lead user in stimulating innovation, Edler and Georghiou 
argue that public procurement is one of a range of measures for delivering innovative 
public infrastructure and services. The UK is highlighted for its systematic and 
advanced approach, with the procurement strategies of the National Health Service 
(NHS) singled out as leading examples of efforts to change practice. 
 
This paper extends the work of Edler and Georghiou by empirically examining the use 
of the ‘private finance initiative’ (PFI) to procure and operate new NHS hospitals. This 
is currently the main procurement route for this type of healthcare infrastructure, and 
one which government has endorsed as a means of stimulating innovation. Specifically, 
we investigate the relationship between the project delivery system (the relationship 
between the funders, contractors and the public sector client) and design innovation. 
Design innovation is seen here in terms of physical adaptability – the ability of a 
building to economically accommodate future changing requirements. This has been a 
long-standing challenge in the provision of healthcare infrastructure, where 
technologies, policies and services are subject to much shorter lifecycles than that of the 
relatively inflexible built assets that support them. The need for adaptability was 
reiterated in 2001 by the then Secretary of State for Health, who argued that innovative 
new hospital designs could help raise care standards and ensure the flexibility needed to 
plan for future medical advances (Dept. of Health, 2001).  
 
The study draws on a conceptual framework for exploring project delivery within the 
rail transport sector developed by Geyer and Davies (2000). Applying this model to the 
healthcare sector, we argue that in its current form the PFI model is unable to promote 
the level of innovation in the design of hospital built assets needed to optimise their 
lifetime clinical efficiency. This is partly due to the relationship between (1) the project 
delivery and (2) hospital operational systems. Through six case studies of new PFI 
hospital projects, we suggest that instead of promoting a higher degree of integration 
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between the project delivery and hospital operational systems, the introduction of PFI 
has resulted in a separation between them. This has led to problems such as disrupted 
communications, complicated patterns of collaboration, misaligned goals and incentives 
and poor inter-project learning. The result is a project delivery model which may be 
producing facilities that are unable to adapt to future healthcare needs and health service 
innovations. 
 
The next section provides a definition of ‘adaptability’, explains its importance with 
regard to current hospital developments, and argues that in this context adaptability can 
be regarded as innovation. We then outline the debate on the use of public demand as an 
engine for innovation and consider the emergence of PFI as a procurement vehicle for 
modernising the UK’s healthcare infrastructure. The following section describes a 
conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between PFI as a project 
delivery mechanism and innovation in hospital design. We also outline three potential 
reasons why innovation might be hard under PFI, in its current configuration. These 
relate to the complexity at the interfaces between the various components of the hospital 
project-operational system, the allocation of risk and rewards within this system, and 
the impact of PFI on opportunities for intra- and inter-project learning. These questions 
are then discussed using findings from the six case studies. Finally, we draw 
conclusions on the policy and practice implications of the empirical findings and the 
usefulness of the conceptual framework. 
 
2. Public procurement, PFI and the modernisation of the UK’s 
healthcare infrastructure 
 
The current interest in demand-side approaches to stimulating innovation, including the 
use of public demand, dates back to the early 1980s when Rothwell and Zegveld (1981) 
argued that state procurement could be a more significant trigger than R&D subsidies. 
As Edler and Georghiou (2007) point out, the use of public procurement for promoting 
innovation is now well developed in the UK. For example, the Department of Trade and 
Industry has highlighted the innovation potential of government as an influential and 
demanding customer (DTI, 2003a and b; cf. CBI & Qinetiq, 2006; Taylor, 2006). At the 
European Union level, directives on procurement (2004/18/EC and 2004/17/EC) have 
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introduced opportunities for public authorities to specify innovative solutions through 
functional performance requirements, opening up bids to alternative ideas, and allowing 
technical and competitive dialogues between purchaser and supplier. 
 
Edler and Georghiou (2007) draw a distinction between two public procurement 
models. First, strategic procurement policies may be designed to encourage demand for 
certain technologies, products or services in order to stimulate the market within a 
particular industrial sector. Second, procurement may be organised to ensure that 
innovation is an essential criterion in the tendering process. An important rationale for 
such a use of public procurement is the perception that purchasing innovative solutions 
potentially improves public infrastructure and services in general. In this regard the 
procurement strategies of the National Health Service (NHS) could be seen as a leading 
example of efforts to change practice. 
 
2.1 The PFI hospitals programme  
 
In the late 1990s the UK government embarked on an ambitious agenda of health 
system reform (NHS 2000). This included a modernisation programme for its outdated 
and inappropriate built infrastructure, worth over £40bn. Introducing the programme, 
the Secretary of State for Health stated ‘We cannot build an NHS for the 21st century 
with hospitals built in the 19th century. The hospital building programme is a key part 
of the Government’s ten year modernisation programme for the health service’ (Dept. of 
Health, 1998). To stimulate investment, various forms of public-private partnership 
were introduced, whereby a capital project for a public sector client was procured and 
often operated by a private sector consortium. The Private Finance Initiative (PFI), one 
of several models of public-private partnership (PPP), is the main funding mechanism 
for hospitals (Boyle and Harrison 2000) and has been used for over 90% of all capital 
schemes in the healthcare sector in England since 19971.  
 
Under the PFI, several private sector partners form a consortium, the ‘special purpose 
vehicle’ (SPV), to deliver capital assets and some services to an NHS hospital trust on a 
                                                 
1 PFI and public capital funded projects over £10 million, given the go-ahead since May 1997 (England) updated to 
17 October 2006. Available from: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Procurementandproposals/Publicprivatepartnership/Privatefinanceinitiative/index.htm - 
accessed 09.06.07 
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long-term contract, generally lasting thirty years or more. In hospital development a PFI 
arrangement typically involves finance, design, construction, facilities management and 
sometimes ‘soft facilities management’ (non-core services such as cleaning and 
catering), for which fees have to be paid over the duration of the contract. The hospital 
trust maintains sole responsibility for all clinical services.  
 
For the government the rationale for the introduction of PFI into hospital procurement 
was threefold. First, it was seen as a way of exploiting the financial strength of the 
private sector and renewing the healthcare built infrastructure faster than would be the 
case under conventional public funding models. Second, PFI was felt to be a way of 
maintaining facilities over the contract lifetime. Huge maintenance backlogs due to 
underinvestment are frequently the reason for existing facilities needing replacement. 
Third – and most pertinent for this paper – the government saw PFI as a way of taking 
advantage of the private sector’s ‘experience and skills in order to bring innovative 
solutions to the needs of the health service’ (NHS Executive 1999: 4). This has been a 
persistent theme in government statements on modernisation of the UK’s healthcare 
infrastructure. It was reiterated by a health minister in 2004, who argued that PFI is  
 
‘much more than a new hospital building programme ... It has to become the 
principal mechanism for getting new design solutions into the NHS, not just in 
buildings but in processes too … Innovation can … accelerate improvements in 
care delivery and care outcomes and increase clinical capacity, e.g. through new 
treatment centres’ (Hutton 9 June 2004).  
 
Within the policy debate around the future provision of healthcare infrastructure there 
has often been an elision between the need for innovation and the need for increased 
adaptability to cope with future unpredictable needs arising from changing demand or 
the introduction of new technologies or care practices. For example, the Secretary of 
State for Health said in 2001 that ‘new hospitals need innovative ward designs to help 
raise care standards and ensure flexibility to plan for future medical advances’ (Dept. of 
Health, 2001).  
 
The need for adaptability in healthcare infrastructure does not only arise from changing 
demand and technological or care service innovation but also through the characteristics 
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of PFI as a delivery model. This is because of the way risk is allocated between the 
public and private sectors. A key consideration of government in establishing the PFI 
was to transfer risk from the public to the private sector. Some operational risks that 
traditionally rested with the client (i.e. the NHS) are transferred to the private 
consortium, but the risks arising from technical obsolescence, changing regulations or 
policies, and unidentified future healthcare needs – including falling demand for 
services – ultimately remain with the hospital trust (Pollock et al. 2002).  
 
Since the public sector still carries all the demand risk and because of the long-term 
contractual arrangements between the private and the public sector, it is essential that 
PFI delivers healthcare facilities that are able to accommodate future change and are 
optimally usable for the NHS during the entire lifecycle of the asset. A key question is 
therefore whether the PFI model is structurally capable of stimulating innovative design 
solutions to reduce the risk of potential future obsolescence arising from fast changing 
care delivery and technology lifecycles. Concern about adaptability and ‘future-
proofing’ of healthcare facilities was raised early in the PFI hospital programme (NHS 
Confederation 2004), along with concerns about the very tight procurement deadlines 
and lack of time to plan adequately, despite the long-term commitment typical of PFI 
contracts (CABE 2000). 
 
2.2 Adaptability in healthcare facilities as ‘innovation’ 
 
Adaptability has long been highlighted as important in planning and delivering 
healthcare facilities, in recognition of the speed of change in services and technologies. 
During the 1960s and 1970s – the previous wave of major hospital investment in the 
UK – the government sought to systematically rationalise and industrialise hospital 
construction. Several innovative design solutions were developed and put into practice. 
The emphasis was on reducing variety in dimensions, components and assemblies to 
achieve economies of scale, quality control and cost predictability, as well as future 
adaptability (Green and Moss 1971; Weeks 1965; Francis et al. 1999).  For example, the 
‘Harness’ approach introduced design flexibility for a variety of functions within 
specified zones and the ‘Nucleus’ model involved a series of standardised elements 
from which hospitals of different sizes and shapes could be assembled. Notions of 
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‘indeterminate architecture’, whereby built assets were seen as continuously evolving, 
underpinned the design and construction of the Northwick Park Hospital. 
 
Following this period there was almost no new construction until the PFI was 
introduced in the late 1990s. The momentum for innovative solutions was lost as the 
organisational infrastructure for hospital planning and delivery was dismantled (see 
below, section 6). Lessons on adaptability from the 1960s and 1970s are now being 
rediscovered, in a new organisational and funding context. It has been argued that 
departures from currently prevailing practices can be seen as a form of innovation (e.g. 
Meyer and Goes 1988) and design ‘adaptability’ can thus be seen as a form of 
innovation. Although it involves a combination of old ideas, it is perceived as novel 
within the current context and innovative thinking is needed to make it work. 
 
We have described how there is increased interest in the use of public procurement as a 
way of stimulating innovation and also the rationale for and use of PFI within the UK 
government’s healthcare infrastructure modernisation programme. We have also noted 
how flexibility and adaptability are regarded as essential for meeting future healthcare 
needs, and that the long contracts under PFI reinforce the need for innovative design 
solutions to achieve this. We will now describe a conceptual framework for 
understanding the interactions between the various organisations involved in PFI 
hospital projects interact and outline a series of research questions which we explore 
through our case studies.  
 
3. Conceptual approach and research questions 
 
In order to investigate the relationship between the PFI delivery mechanism and 
innovation in hospital design it is necessary to consider the interfaces between the 
various organisations involved in hospital projects. A framework proposed by Geyer 
and Davies (2000), combining concepts of ‘complex products and systems’ (CoPS) and 
‘large technical systems’ (LTS), provides some insight into the innovation processes in 
complex infrastructure project environments.  
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The core organisational components in an LTS are (a) project-based CoPS suppliers and 
(b) the system operators or service suppliers. There is an interface between the project 
supply network and the operational system. Innovation activities need to be understood 
in terms of an interactive relationship between the project which is situated in the LTS 
and the operational system which the project supports. Both sides – the project and the 
operational systems – influence and shape each other, creating a dynamic that stimulates 
innovative behaviour, forming a ‘project-system innovation cycle’.  
 
This framework is useful for investigating innovative behaviour in large hospital 
developments since these display hallmarks of CoPS – they are high value and 
engineering intensive, use many customised components and are often delivered by 
networks of companies (Hobday 1998). Since CoPS are often one-off projects, they 
involve a considerable degree of risk and therefore need close collaboration between 
users and project suppliers (Hobday 2000). Geyer and Davies (2000) argue that in this 
type of environment systems integration and effective coordination capabilities play 
important roles in successful innovation. Close collaboration and open communication 
has long been seen as essential for successful innovation in the construction industry 
and overcoming problems associated with its focus on the delivery of one-off, highly 
customised products  (e.g. Barlow et al. 1997; Slaughter 1998; Winch 1998; Barlow 
2000; Slaughter 2000; Dulaimi et al. 2003; Leiringer 2006), as well as more generally in 
CoPS.  
 
There has been some debate over the potential of PPP models for improving 
construction processes and stimulating innovation. Barlow et al. (1997) argued that PFI 
– at least as it was then emerging in the UK – was potentially detrimental to true 
partnering between project collaborators because of the lack of risk-reward sharing 
mechanisms. Others have suggested that the emergence of integrated procurement 
contexts under PFI may provide a much more supportive climate for collaborative ways 
of working (Green et al. 2004). Leiringer (2006) hypothesises that greater clarity over 
the assumed risks, due to more explicit risk-transfer under a PPP, might benefit 
innovative activities. Some feel that as a key coordinating agency, taking on financial, 
design and operational responsibility for the fixed capital asset, SPVs provide system 
integration and coordination capabilities (Davies and Salter 2006). 
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We suggest that within the hospital development sector, under the current form of PFI, 
there is a missing link between infrastructure provision (project execution) and care 
delivery (operation) because systems integration and coordination capabilities are weak. 
This might significantly impede innovative design solutions which could help to 
accommodate future healthcare needs. Building on this contention, we now outline three 
research questions regarding the potential implications of PFI for the delivery of 
adaptable healthcare projects.  
 
The first relates to the complexity at the interfaces between the various components of 
the hospital project-operational system. Brady et al. (2005) argue that the use of PPPs 
for major infrastructure means that responsibility coordinating planning, design, 
construction and operation has shifted from public bodies to the private sector, without 
creating any more integration between the different project delivery stages. In hospital 
development the PFI not only resulted in a strict separation between infrastructure 
provision and care delivery operations, but it also inserted another administrative layer 
between the design capability (architects and planners) and the clinical users (NHS) due 
to the introduction of SPVs. Together, these features potentially hinder communication 
across the interface between care and infrastructure providers, making collaboration 
more difficult. 
 
The second question involves the allocation of risk and rewards within the project and 
operational systems. Construction contracts typically push project participants to 
employ well tried methods to reduce their project risks. A number of commentators 
have emphasised the importance of mechanisms allowing the rewards for innovation to 
be distributed according to the risk that each party has assumed (Barlow et al. 1997; 
Winch 1998; Barlow 2000; Slaughter 2000). Leiringer (2006) found that on PPP 
projects project funders were unwilling to assume any additional risks often associated 
with innovation. Under the current PFI model the contract is designed to ensure as much 
certainty as possible, as early as possible in the design process, in order to minimise 
project risks. This potentially reduces the likelihood of innovative behaviour later on as 
the project unfolds. This problem is compounded by the isolation of the SPV from 
clinical operations – under the current PFI model the SPV is incentivised to reduce its 
direct costs but there are no incentives to innovate in order to improve clinical care 
processes.  
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Third, innovation is potentially hindered through reduced opportunities for intra- and 
inter-project learning. Feedback loops from earlier to later project stages have been 
found to be useful in enhancing project delivery and project outcomes (Geyer and 
Davies 2000). In addition, information relating to performance and operational 
requirements fed back from the operational side into project development helps to 
increase innovation activities and improve project outcomes (Davies 2004).  
 
Learning from project to project is another important aspect of innovative behaviour in 
project-based firms (Winch 1998; Gann 2000; Gann and Salter 2000). However, it has 
often been noted that learning from experiences is potentially lost in construction since 
projects are typically executed by temporary networks of firms that disband after the 
project is completed (e.g. Akintoye et al. 2003).  
 
4. Methodology 
 
The research followed a three-stage process that involved detailed case studies of PFI 
schemes and shorter case studies of hospitals developed before the introduction of PFI. 
In the first stage we conducted informal background interviews with nineteen domain 
experts in order to build a thorough understanding of the issues and help to identify 
possible case studies. Interviewees included senior representatives from the NHS, the 
Department of Health, construction industries, architectural and legal practices, and PFI 
consultants.  
 
Second, short case studies of six hospitals known for design innovativeness and built 
during the pre-PFI delivery model were undertaken. These case studies involved 
informal interviews with health architects and planners with knowledge of the hospitals, 
site visits, and evaluation of background documentary material. 
 
Third, the main data collection phase involved detailed case studies of the planning, 
delivery and operation process of six case study PFI schemes, around a quarter of all the 
schemes in the initial PFI phase (see table 1). We are required to maintain 
confidentiality over the locations of these hospitals. The research included semi-
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structured interviews with key stakeholders, site visits and analysis of background 
documentary material. Data collection was carried out over a nine month period in the 
second half of 2005 and early 2006.  
 
The selection of suitable cases proved difficult – good examples of adaptable and 
innovative PFI schemes could neither be identified in the discussions with experts nor 
through the specialist press or other official reports. The examples chosen were largely 
based on recommendations of experts who felt that the schemes were representative of a 
suitable range of design and contextual features.  
 
Thirty-one key stakeholders from SPVs and the hospital authorities were interviewed, 
including trust project directors, trust clinical planners, managers of SPVs and 
contractors, facilities management service managers, and architects. The semi-
structured interviews were guided by an interview protocol consisting of forty open-
ended questions, including sub-questions to substantiate given answers. In some cases 
two interviewers were present. All interviewees were assured of confidentiality to elicit 
as much unrestricted information as possible. Interviews were taped, when possible, or 
manually recorded during the discussion. All findings from the case studies were 
analysed in an evaluation matrix to explore common themes.  
 
The preliminary research findings were then presented to the project advisory board 
(comprising experts from healthcare architecture and construction) and at a workshop 
including other academic researchers and 45 representatives from healthcare policy and 
services, and the construction supply chain. 
 
Table 1 (Case study sites) about here 
 
5. Findings from case studies 
 
We have grouped our findings into four subsections, addressing the research questions 
discussed above and more general issues. We then consider the extent to which PFI – as 
a form of public procurement – has acted as a stimulus to innovation within healthcare 
infrastructure provision. 
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5.1 Contracts, communication and collaboration 
 
We outlined above how the additional layer of the SPV potentially acts as a barrier 
between the project delivery and healthcare operational systems, disrupting 
communication patterns and creating difficulties for collaboration between the project 
stakeholders.  
 
In a PFI project the main contract is between the hospital trust and the SPV. It was 
found that the case study SPVs often insisted to project stakeholders that all 
communication with planners and subcontractors had to go through them. It was 
repeatedly pointed out that since the hospital trust is not the owner of the facility, the 
SPV only assigns this partner a limited role in project delivery – as the commercial 
manager for one contractor put it, ‘the client is the bank and the trust is just a tenant’. 
Collaboration after completion of the project was also felt by some trusts to be difficult 
– one interviewee compared the SPV to ‘a king in a castle’ since it was the leaseholder 
of the buildings and site and had to agree to any changes. 
In several cases it was reported that the SPV was apprehensive of overly close 
relationships between the healthcare planners working for the trust and the architects. 
According to the director of planning for one trust, 
 
‘We had very good relationships with (the) architects, which benefited the project. 
However, the SPV was concerned about this closeness and tried to prevent the close 
contact. Eventually, we were allowed to deal directly with the architects, though a 
representative of the SPV had to be present at each meeting, which slowed the process 
down’. 
 
Some architects therefore believed their loyalties were divided as they were employed 
by the SPV’s contractor but felt responsible to the hospital trust and the users of the 
proposed facility. According to one architect, there was a feeling that the practice had to 
service two ‘clients’, the SPV and the hospital trust and its users.  Another said that ‘our 
contract was with (the SPV) so we were not supposed to talk directly to the users (but) 
we talked to them anyway’. In this example, the relationship between the contractor, the 
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client and architect became very fragile, and the architect felt that while they got on well 
with the trust the SPV contractor ‘was a barrier between us’. 
 
The contractual arrangements under the case study PFIs also caused problems in 
communication between the NHS trust and the project subcontractors. In one example, 
the trust and the soft facilities management supplier agreed to upgrade a catering outlet. 
This caused problems because the SPV would have been required to take on 
maintenance responsibilities beyond those specified in the original contractual. 
 
In only one case study was the position of the SPV within the overall project structure 
seen as relatively unproblematic. Here, the SPV was described by interviewees from the 
hospital trust as an intermediary between the different stakeholders, providing a 
supporting role and aiding communication. In this case, the SPV wished to focus on 
commercial property development opportunities associated with hospitals and it was 
therefore concerned to develop a long-term relationship with the NHS. It therefore had a 
clear incentive to ensure good design quality and a degree of adaptability to allow for 
future commercial development. Generally, however, communication was seen as 
difficult, with a detrimental effect on collaboration, both during the project planning 
phase and during project execution. 
 
During the project planning phases it was reported that feedback from the clinical 
operational side to the SPV and its subcontractors was neither direct, nor sufficiently 
timely. This hampered the planning process. One interviewee from a hospital trust felt 
that the SPV was unprepared for the amount of consultation and degree of involvement 
of clinical users required. In another case, the trust was unaware of the need for 
contractors and architects to have prior information on the medical equipment likely to 
be installed in order to plan for appropriate floor loadings and electrical capacities. 
 
Hospital trusts themselves appeared to hinder the free flow of information from end 
users to the consortium during the planning phase. It was suggested that trusts were 
often content simply to receive a new hospital without becoming involved in detailed 
planning. According to one SPV director,  ‘the trust thinks that procuring a PFI hospital 
is like buying a ready-made house and they do not realise how much input is required 
from them’. In this example the contractor’s director of construction felt that the trust 
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‘just saw the finished product but not the process. They would have liked to go away 
after financial close and have a finished hospital in several years’. It was also claimed 
that trusts often underestimated the importance of their input into the delivery process. 
This resulted in a failure on their part to consider, before the planning process started, 
how clinical processes could be redesigned to take advantage of the new facilities. In 
one example it was felt that the resulting buildings were therefore built for current – 
rather than future – working practices.  
 
Disrupted communications were also present during the project execution phase, 
leading to misunderstandings and – according to some interviewees – new ideas not 
being voiced and discussed. As one healthcare architect said,  
 
‘The delivery process was very confrontational with a lot of screaming and shouting. 
If we could have talked with the contractor more, the project would have been better.’ 
 
The project director for this trust felt that:  
‘the trust was not seen as the client but rather as an impediment. The SPV was not 
good in controlling the contractor. Relationships among all parties were quite 
aggressive because of the underlying investment vehicle and the tight construction 
budget and timeframe.’  
The combination of contractual arrangements and the position of the SPV between the 
operational system – the clinical end-users of the hospital – and the project system 
therefore hindered communication and collaboration. As a result the input of operational 
data, essential for planning for future adaptability, into the project design phase appears 
to have been restricted. 
 
5.2 Contracts, risk and incentives 
 
We argued above that in order to stimulate innovation, each party assuming project risk 
should share in any benefits that arise from innovation. Under PFI it was felt to be more 
difficult to achieve agreement on the introduction of new ideas because of a separation 
in responsibilities between the project consortium and clinical operations. Whereas the 
main goal for the NHS was a facility delivering excellent healthcare to its patients, for 
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the private sector partners a hospital project was mainly seen as an investment vehicle. 
This mismatch in incentives resulted in more cautious attitudes towards risk, especially 
when associated with innovative solutions.  
 
Reflecting the government’s goal of using PFI to inject design and construction 
innovation into hospital procurement, the technical services manager for one SPV 
argued that ‘innovation’ could be seen as an important sales factor in securing projects. 
An architect on another scheme felt that offering adaptability in design could help 
consortia win bids. However, we found a tension between the potential for promoting 
innovation at the bid stage and the risk averse attitude that prevailed within PFI 
consortia. Risk aversity was a result of three factors – the competitive bidding 
environment, a desire by PFI funders to protect their investment in the long term and 
trusts’ desire to transfer risk to the private sector. 
 
First, bidders were asked to design to a given brief, often containing statements about 
the need for adaptability but without detailed specifications regarding adaptability. In 
two of the case studies, consortia bidding against each other for a project were therefore 
unwilling to offer more than the minimum necessary for a successful bid. There was a 
feeling that since design is carried out concurrently with the tendering phase – when 
collaboration and open discussion of new ideas is restricted – opportunities for 
innovation under PFI were very limited. As one contractor observed, ‘innovation would 
need to start during the bidding process... After financial close it is too late’. In this 
example the director of design for the architects therefore felt that that the PFI process 
restricted the flow of ideas at the bid stage because ‘there is always a fear from the 
consortium that it might lose the project in the bidding phase’. 
 
Second, pressure to use ‘tried and tested’ methods was exerted by the PFI funders to 
protect their return on investment. The long-term contractual arrangements and severe 
penalties for any non-availability of hospital facilities therefore tended to drive the 
private sector partners to reduce their risk by using conventional design and 
construction solutions . One interviewee, an SPV project director, summarised the 
position thus: ‘PFI stifles innovative solutions. Investors and financers are not interested 
in innovation; they do not want to take risk’.  
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Third, on the hospital trust side there was an emphasis on the transfer of risk to the 
private sector and a consequent reluctance to approve any solutions which were untested 
or required derogation from current guidance (the official ‘health building notes’ and 
‘health technical memoranda’). This tends to be highly prescriptive and does not 
provide much scope for creative solutions. According to one interviewee this 
‘suffocated the product’, citing their inability to introduce an innovative, flexible 
oxygen tubing system – which offered advantages in installation and use – into their 
project. In this case the trust argued that the proposed system did not comply with the 
relevant guidance documents, dating from 1956. Another problem is that output 
specifications built into PFI contracts focus mainly on technical objectives with 
measurable targets (e.g. wind loads, flame spread, slip resistance, sound transmission) 
and do not include any detailed requirement for infrastructure adaptability.  
 
As well as pressures mitigating against innovation which arise from the competitive and 
financial context for PFI, the different background and business objectives of the 
stakeholders involved in a typical project can be problematic – incentives towards 
innovation are poorly aligned and the risks and rewards from innovation are unevenly 
distributed, making it difficult to take any untested, new ideas forward. This 
misalignment is manifested both in the SPV / hospital trust relationship and internally 
within the SPV itself.  
 
The SPV is obliged to its financiers’ interests and not to the clinical operations of the 
trust. This means that it has no direct interest in adaptability or innovation that would 
promote future clinical efficiency. The focus for the SPV and its financiers is firmly on 
initial capital cost, and it was argued that additional spending could not be justified 
unless the investment could be directly recouped. As one hospital trust project director 
put it, ‘the SPV (has) no incentive to implement any innovative ideas, unless it 
increase(s) their profit’. In fact there is a disincentive for the SPV to introduce 
adaptability, partly because the rewards would only benefit the trust but also because 
additional income could be achieved through making alterations to the building in the 
future. 
 
Misalignment of goals was also a feature of relationships within the SPV itself. It was 
reported by an SPV finance and contracts manager that:  
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‘there is always a fight between the contractor and the SPV because of the differing 
agendas they have. The contractor completes the job and is basically done with it, 
whereas the SPV is responsible for the facility for the next thirty five years.’ 
 
Since the companies responsible for construction and facilities management were 
usually different, and only the latter has to bear the cost of future maintenance, 
innovative solutions to reduce future maintenance costs but with a higher initial cost for 
the contractor were not implemented. However, interviewees indicated that this attitude 
is now changing – partners within PFI consortia are learning to coordinate their 
activities and incorporate incentive mechanisms in their internal agreements that allow 
the lifecycle costs of the facility to be taken into account.  
 
5.3 Inter-project learning  
 
Learning from project to project is a necessary foundation for the effective development 
of new innovative ideas. Since PFI hospital projects generally involve large one-off 
undertakings, learning from project to project is potentially weakened. 
 
All private sector partners reported that they used various strategies to capture lessons 
following the completion of PFI schemes. These included project reviews, feedback 
sessions and close-down workshops. They had also created databases of lifecycle 
maintenance costs and intranet tools to capture information about best practice. 
Together these were seen as an aid to ‘the learning process for future hospital projects’, 
as one contractor’s design and construction manager said. However, the competitive 
environment ensures that although some experiences are shared within in the PFI 
consortium lessons learnt are typically only captured within the individual firm.  
 
Knowledge gained by hospital trusts from experiences on PFI projects is often not 
systematically captured since they generally execute only one PFI project. In only one 
case was a detailed post-project evaluation executed, which was published over the 
internet. Moreover, according to the healthcare director for one architect, the transfer of 
knowledge between individual trusts is very limited, with knowledge gained on PFI 
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schemes residing largely within the consortia and architects or individuals within trusts. 
Because of this, according to the healthcare director of one architect, 
 
‘the old problems of inexperienced trusts still exist, despite the available information, 
and trusts are no more able to articulate their needs and compile an adequate brief.’ 
 
5.4 The role of other factors in hindering innovation 
 
The PFI model is not the sole reason why innovation was impeded in the case study 
projects; two further areas need to be highlighted. First, the affordability of schemes 
was of paramount importance to hospital trusts. The need to reduce costs to match the 
approved affordability limits established by the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) was 
often cited as reason for low levels of innovation. Under the PSC, a trust would develop 
an outline proposal demonstrating its needs. This was submitted for approval by the 
Department of Health. On several occasions, interviewees mentioned that the PSC 
costings were unrealistically optimistic with very low estimates of required budgets. 
This in turn was responsible for a low level of innovation or future proofing during 
project planning phases. Although not explored in our case studies, the Payment by 
Result (PbR) mechanism, by which hospitals generate revenue according to numbers of 
patients they treat, further increases affordability constrains. This is because the current 
PbR mechanism does not allow for the high availability charges incurred through PFI 
projects. Typically because of these affordability issues, measures for future adaptability 
could not be included and further development of the hospital would only be possible 
on a piecemeal basis. In one example, affordability limits did not allow for increased 
structural loads to provide future vertical expansion potential. 
 
Second, cultural differences between the private and public sectors were also felt to be 
significant. This was expressed by interviewees from SPVs in terms of a ‘public sector 
mentality’ that did not allow representatives from the trust to ‘think outside the box’. 
According to a manager from a contractor, ‘(we) need a committee and a signature for 
everything, even the smallest thing. This is design by committee’.  However, another 
problem was the need for hospital trusts to respond to immediate operational or policy 
requirements, and their short term time horizons.  Reorganisation of the NHS was felt to 
be ‘stifling the focus on the future even further’. This was described by the director of 
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nursing of one trust thus: ‘The (SPV) would like five years’ advanced noticed (of 
requirements), but this is not NHS culture. It is short-term, fulfilling today’s needs’.   
 
6. Discussion 
 
The PFI model for hospital procurement and operation represents an example of 
government attempting to stimulate innovation by influencing public demand 
characteristics. In this section we discuss how successful this has been and how the PFI 
model compares with previous forms of procurement in this sector.  
 
The structure of the NHS changed significantly with the establishment of semi-
autonomous hospital trusts and the introduction of the PFI. Previously the approach was 
analogous to that of the highly integrated railway monopoly described in Geyer and 
Davies (2000). Fifteen Regional Hospital Boards (RHBs) were responsible for 
healthcare provision in their catchment area. Consisting of multidisciplinary teams 
drawn from clinical, health management and engineering and construction professions, 
RHBs were also responsible for hospital development initiated by individual hospital 
management committees (see figure 1). Their coordinating role for centrally funded 
hospital projects was supported by research and guidance conducted in the Hospital 
Planning Unit (HPU) of the Department of Health. In addition to the expertise provided 
by the Department of Health, specialist training and research was provided by the 
Medical Architecture Research Unit (Rawlinson, 1985). Under this model, innovative 
solutions to the pressures arising from changes in healthcare needs were partly driven 
by the HPU and mediated by individual hospital management committees (Francis et al 
1999). 
 
In addition, RHBs collaborated in ‘super regional planning’ with their neighbours, 
resulting in effective service delivery with efficient resource allocation (Moss, 1977). 
The high level of integration and communication among the multidisciplinary staff of 
the RHBs and their close ties to the individual hospitals within their region not only 
allowed an in-depth understanding of healthcare needs and related infrastructure 
requirements but also close collaboration between infrastructure planners and 
infrastructure users. This resulted in forward-looking solutions such as Northwick Park 
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Hospital, designed to accommodate future changes easily without disruption to clinical 
operations (Weeks, 1980). Furthermore feedback and learning from one project to the 
next was maximised. 
 
Figure 1 (Previous project-operational system in hospital development) about here 
 
Following the introduction of the PFI model, hospitals were procured individually and a 
degree of competition amongst hospital trusts was introduced. Central/regional planning 
bodies were dissolved and only partially transferred to the arms-length agency of NHS 
Estates (Francis et al., 1999). Although NHS Estates continued to provide guidance for 
hospital development, the hospital planning capabilities of the past have not been 
replaced.  As a result of these changes, the relationship between the organisational 
network responsible for the project and the hospital operators was radically altered. 
Under the PFI model, the network of suppliers, some of which form the PFI consortium 
itself, is not only responsible for the construction project itself but also the delivery of 
future facilities management and often other non-clinical services for the duration of the 
contract. There is, however, a strict separation between infrastructure provision and 
clinical services delivery, which remains the responsibility of the NHS (figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 (Current project-operational system in hospital development) about here 
 
We suggest that the missing link between infrastructure provision (project execution) 
and care delivery (service operation) within the PFI process has impeded innovative 
solutions for accommodating future changing healthcare needs through adaptable 
hospital infrastructure. This has occurred in two significant ways. 
 
The first relates to the way risk is borne within the project and operational system. The 
research confirmed that the inefficient allocation of risks hindered innovation. In order 
to minimise project risks the PFI is designed to ensure as much certainty as early as 
possible in the procurement, design and construction process. Since the private sector 
consortium responsible for the scheme bears the majority of project risk, NHS hospital 
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trusts have to specify their requirements very precisely and well in advance in order to 
eliminate as much uncertainty as possible. Because of this there is only limited scope 
for agreeing solutions that are appropriate for facilitating future flexibility. Highly 
specific design and specification requirements of commissioning authorities have 
therefore constrained innovation in hospital design and construction (cf. Zitron, 2004). 
 
Second, innovation has been impeded by the increased complexity in the interfaces 
between the various components of the hospital project-operational system. The case 
studies found that PFI had not led to more collaborative ways of working, nor did the 
SPV act as a form of systems integrator. Indeed, the SPV resulted in a strict separation 
between the project delivery and clinical operational sides, hindering communications 
and inserting another administrative layer between the design capability (the architect) 
and the end users of the building (the NHS). Furthermore, although this was not 
investigated in detail, the case studies suggested that the tendency of consortia and 
trusts to execute single PFI projects, and the weak input of information from clinical 
operations into the project supply, limits inter-project learning and the future application 
of any innovation that does occur within projects. 
 
The framework developed by Geyer and Davies (2000) proved useful in helping to 
illuminate the dynamic relationship between project delivery and operational system. It 
demonstrated that innovation processes within complex PFI projects cannot be 
examined without considering the operational context in which they are situated. A 
limitation in applying the framework within this context is the difficulty in defining the 
boundaries of the operational system. In our work, we sought insight from individual 
projects, which are situated within an individual hospital trust and its operations. This 
constituted the boundary for our operational system. However, in further research a 
higher level perspective could be adopted and the operational system could include the 
regional or even national healthcare system. Further research is also needed to apply the 
framework to different types of funding and procurement models prevalent within UK 
healthcare infrastructure provision2 or across different national health systems, so that 
more generalisable insights into the implications of delivery methods for innovative 
healthcare infrastructure can be developed. 
                                                 
2 For example LIFT, another form of PPP in use in the UK for healthcare infrastructure, where there are 
different incentives for innovation and potentially more stability between consortia. 
23 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Edler and Georghiou (2007) argue that there is a need to place ‘public demand’ more 
centrally within innovation policy and use it to complement supply side measures. We 
have explored the reality of a public procurement model that is currently targeted at the 
delivery of hospital infrastructure. We found that in its current form, PFI may have been 
less effective in stimulating design innovation than the model it replaced, which 
involved greater coordination across individual project and operational systems, and 
across geographical boundaries. Increasing the role of the private sector in the delivery 
of public infrastructure projects has therefore not provided the innovation benefits 
desired by the UK government.  
 
This is not to suggest that PFI or other variants are incapable of delivering innovation. It 
should be noted that the selected case studies were all early examples of PFI hospital 
schemes. It is possible that later projects have demonstrated learning and improved 
innovation outcomes. An updated model, ‘smart PFI’, is also currently being 
introduced, in which the design phase is removed from the PFI tendering process in 
order to allow greater discussion about alternative solutions. However, the main 
structural problem – a separation of the project supply side, through the private sector 
consortium, and operational services delivered through the NHS – remains unresolved. 
To overcome this, the SPV should incorporate a coordinating and integrating function 
that furthers the relationship between project supply and clinical operations, rather than 
restricting it.  
 
We believe that policy makers should not only ‘learn the readiness of industry to deliver 
innovations’, as suggested by Edler and Georghiou (2007, 959), but they should also 
incentivise industry to deliver innovation. A public-private delivery model that includes 
incentive mechanisms for the partners to consider quality and efficiency improvements 
in the hospital’s care outcomes (e.g. length of stay, hospital acquired infection rates) 
might be far more effective in helping to exploit the innovative potential of the private 
sector in providing healthcare infrastructure.  
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Table 1. Case study sites  
 
Hospital Attributes 
A  
 
Greenfield site. Early PFI with a repetitive, standardised structure and 
standardised, multifunctional rooms. 
B  Greenfield site. Early PFI, whose matrix design was intended to be internally 
adaptable, with expansion space on site. 
C  
 
Example of a ‘Nucleus’ hospital with a major PFI expansion woven into the 
existing structure. Example of adaptive development over 30 years. 
D  
 
Existing site. Modular construction approach, partially based on existing 
foundations. 
E  
 
Major extension to existing facilities. ‘Doughnut-shaped’ ward layouts to 
encourage flexible ward management; top floor adjustable for different 
functions. 
F  Urban site. Flexible ward layouts developed for the innovative service 
delivery model of ‘graduated care’ 
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Figure 1. Previous project-operational system in hospital development. 
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Figure 2. Current project-operational system in hospital development 
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